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CONCLUSION
Ronald Thiemann's Religion in Public Life is truly a welcome addition to the ever-expanding literature on religion, law,
and politics. His work presents a well-reasoned, even-handed,
and intellectually defensible attempt to bring some measure of
balance to its subject. Though perhaps slightly too abstract in its
formulation and possibly a bit too wide-ranging in its breadth,
these arguably are signs not of commonplace deficiency, but of
its potentiality as a work of genuine cultural significance. Especially noteworthy is Thiemann's attempt to render the philosophical and legal dimensions of the debate over religion in public life
accessible to a relatively broad readership. Frequently confined
to certain elite or professional quarters, this debate plainly has
relevance that extends well beyond the academic halls and judicial chambers. The periodic manifestation of elite discourse
through legal doctrines and other expressions of public policy,
and the frequent assertion by proponents that many of its constituent arguments are simply expressions of our deep constitutional
commitments, demand that it not, in fact, stray too far from the
public domain. Religion in Public Life laudably attempts to rein
in both the esotericism and the ideological excess of this debate,
and in so doing makes a genuine contribution to the present and
future understanding of religion as an indelible feature of the
American political landscape.

TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. By Scott Douglas Gerbef.l New York
and London: New York University Press. 1995. Pp. 315
Cloth $45.00.
Stephen B. Presserz

For some time, Constitutional interpretation in the American courts and academy has been borrowing from other disciplines. At the height of the Warren Court's adventures in
Constitutional law-making, for example, sociology and social
1. Scott Douglas Gerber, Ph.D., J.D., is Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary.
2. Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History at Northwestern University School of
Law, and currently a Fulbright Senior Scholar and an Adams Fellow at the Institute of
United States Studies at the University of London.
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psychology were useful adjuncts to Constitutional law, most famously in Brown's Footnote 11. As academics sought to understand, or perhaps to justify, what the Warren Court had done,
other bodies of knowledge were turned to, most prominently
moral philosophy, as in the work of Ronald Dworkin, Michael
Perry, and others. John Hart Ely, and those influenced by him,
tried to recast Constitutional Law as applied pluralistic political
science. In the meantime other scholars, most notably Richard
Posner, had been experimenting with borrowing from classical
economics, and, in just the recent past, Constitutional theorists
have raided the domain of American historians.
While the lawyers were up to all that, among historians,
something called "republicanism" was all the rage, as Americanists sought to argue that it wasn't Lockean liberalism (with its
purportedly attendant possessive individualism) that was at the
bottom of the struggle for the Federal Constitution, but rather an
altruistic and disinterested attempt to promote communitarian
values in general and civic virtue in particular. I can't speak for
the fate of most of the other disciplines, but I can say with some
confidence that it wasn't long before historians decided that "republicanism" was a much more complex matter than simply a
desire to promote civic virtue, and the historical fraternity appears to be on the way to concluding that the early history of our
republic can best be understood by considering Republicanism as
only one of at least three important civic ideologies-the other
two being the formerly discredited Lockean Liberalism and the
once popular-but more recently neglected-Protestant Christianity.3 These developments in historiography have not yet adequately been reflected in Constitutional jurisprudence, which
tends superficially to borrow from the other social sciences, as
other disciplines lose their degrees of nuance when employed by
lawyers.
In any event, at the same time these attempts to raid social
science for guidance on the Constitution were under way there
was always a feeling that perhaps law could be regarded as at
least a semi-autonomous scientific discipline. This feeling was
manifested, surely, by Herbert Wechsler's famous effort to discern neutral principles for constitutional interpretation, and perhaps in the work of several of his disciples, most notably
Alexander Bickel. Most recently the jurisprudence of neutral
3. The seminal piece in this regard is James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism· Christillnity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J.
Am. Hist. 9 (1987).
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principles, now in the guise of original intention or original understanding, was carried out-primarily by critics of Warren
Court expansionism-by Messrs. Meese, Bork, and Berger.
The newest game in constitutional interpretation town, I suspect, is the effort by several scholars of late eighteenth century
history (among whose numbers I modestly include myself)4 to
move beyond what might have been perceived as a negative approach to original intention or original understanding, and to appreciate the early Constitution on its own terms, informed not by
current philosophical fads in the legal or arts and sciences faculties, but (adopting the latest work by American historians) rather
by an understanding of the complex of philosophical, political,
and economic conceptions that were prevalent at the time of the
Constitution's drafting and adoption. This is a tricky business,
because to do it properly requires not only legal training, but
probably professional training in history (or at least enough years
to get grandfathered in), and/or perhaps even an advanced degree in political science or government.
As if this were not enough, an attempt must be made to appreciate the social sciences in the manner of our Framers, when
law, politics, economics, history, moral philosophy, and religion
were all integrated pieces of one holistic approach to life and law.
Not for nothing was what we now know as economics called
"political economy," and common it was for many of the founding generation to believe that it was impossible to implement law
without morality and morality without religion.
The results of a new kind of interdisciplinary approach to
and appreciation of the late eighteenth century founding years
have begun to accumulate, and they seem promising and exciting.
1\vo notable efforts in this regard are William Casto's recent
book on the early federal courts,s and David Mayer's interdisciplinary study of Thomas Jefferson's constitutional theory (such as
it was).6 Now, in this vein, comes Scott Gerber's new book on
constitutional interpretation, To Secure These Rights.
Like Casto and Mayer, Gerber deploys interdisciplinary
tools, most prominently those acquired as a Ph.D. studying under
Henry Abraham at Virginia. The result is an extraordinarily am4. Stephen B. Presser, Recapturing the Constitution: Race, Religion, and Abonion
Reconsidered (Regnery Pub., 1994) and Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law
and Jurisprudence in American History (West, 3d ed. 1995).
5. Wtlliam R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellswonh (U. of South Carolina Press, 1995).
6. David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson (U. Press of
Virginia, 1994).
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bitious and, given the possible pitfalls, a remarkably successful
first book, an essay in constitutional exegesis which should now
be required reading for anyone seeking to understand the animating spirit of the 1787 document and the Bill of Rights which
followed. Gerber's work is not free from problems (whose is?),
and it is probably fair to say that he raises almost as many questions as he answers, but in his volume, as was true for earlier
efforts by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J.G.A. Pocock,7 to
provoke disagreement and discussion is likely to be the mark of a
vital and seminal work. .
Indeed, it is Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock who furnish the starting-off point for Gerber. To Secure These Rights is an attempt to
shift focus from "Republican" or "Civic virtue" explanations of
the origin of our constitutional law, and to return to an appreciation of the Lockean influence on the framers. (pp. 23-32) Not
even the most zealous advocates of the Republican reading of
the Constitution (with exception of the strange attempt by Garry
Willss) argued that Locke was not influential in the writing of the
Declaration of Independence, but virtually all American historians have recently argued that America, in the years following the
Declaration, moved away from Locke, as it was demonstrated
that Lockean notions, when put into practice, seemed to lead to
legislative irresponsibility and nearly total breakdowns in American provincial government. Indeed, as the Constitution itself was
in the process of being drafted, rebels in Western Massachusetts
who had declared themselves in a Lockean state of nature and
had rendered nugatory the power of state authorities had just
been subdued.
In the course of his reexamination of the notions of Locke,
the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution, Gerber
concludes that it is wrong to think that the influence of the Declaration suddenly evaporated. Instead, after a review of the writings of such framers as Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and Wilson, as
well as Jefferson, he makes out a powerful case that the Declaration was still very much in the minds of both the Constitution's
proponents and its foes, and that the Constitution is best under7. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Belknap
Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776·1787 (U. of
North Carolina Press, 1969); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Polit·
ical Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton U. Press, 1975).
8. Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
(Doubleday & Co., 1978). Says Gerber, "Most scholars no longer take Wills's Scottish
[Enlightenment] reading of the Declaration of Independence seriously, believing that his
thesis was demolished in a superb review essay by Ronald Hamoway." (27n.)
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stood, as his title suggests, as a means of implementing the rights
outlined in the Declaration.
The Declaration's Lockean inalienable rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness (or perhaps the accumulation of
property) furnish Gerber with a dynamic constitutional philosophy which allows the possibility of adopting the Constitution to
meet the exigencies of a people struggling to establish a just society in a manner not yet seen in history. Gerber concludes that
the proper posture of constitutional interpreters, then and now,
is what he calls "liberal originalism." (pp. 1-4, 6-8) He believes
that he is being faithful to the original understandings of the document's drafters and ratifiers, but he eschews what he regards as
the modem "conservative" approach to constitutional interpretation, which he says demands that the constitution be read simply
as the establishment of a majority-rule democracy. (pp. 4-6)
Gerber shares with many current conservatives the belief
that the Warren and Berger courts improperly made constitutional law according to their particular political preferences
rather than following any valid constitutional philosophy (and he
singles out Justices Brennan and Marshall for special excoriation). (See, e.g., pp. 9-11, 177) But he believes that conservatives
such as Meese and Bork and some of their positivist fellow travelers have failed to appreciate that the Constitution was about
more than popular sovereignty, and that instead it was to incorporate a jurisprudence of natural rights.
One could certainly quibble with Gerber's definition of
"conservative" here-he probably too easily links Meese and
Bork with Blackstone and Burke, and fails to realize that a
Burkean approach to law might well include some of the jurisprudential approaches he favors9-but he does succeed in fatally
undermining the historical arguments that some conservatives
have been making against a jurisprudence informed by supraconstitutional principles. He demolishes this positivistic approach, for example, by demonstrating quite nicely that the only
Justice to argue against a natural-rights based jurisprudence of
the constitution (to argue, in other words, against "great principles of republican government" which circumscribed any American legislature-state or federal), Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull,
was not only quite out of step with his contemporaries, but inexplicably had abandoned his own clear views to the contrary
voiced a scant few years before. (pp. 111-112, 118-119)
9.
4).

On this point see generally Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note
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Somewhat more troubling difficulties are presented, however, by what often seems to be Gerber's notion that the "natural
rights" philosophy of the Declaration ought to be regarded as the
be-all and end-all for Constitutional interpretation. He is certainly to be commended for elegantly laying out what the past,
present, and future content of such a jurisprudence would look
like. His book is a particular delight, as well, because he actually
takes a stand on the most difficult constitutional questions now
facing us, for example those involving race, religion, abortion,
sexual preference, and the right to die. (pp. 164-195) Still, in
order to pull this off, Gerber is forced to move his "natural
rights" notions from the Declaration and Locke to a higher level
of generality than that employed by the framers or by Locke
himself, (see, e.g., pp. 189-190) and once he moves to this higher
level of generality it is difficult not to conclude that his theory
would suffer from the same open-ended character of that, say,
manifested by Justice Brennan.lo
Thus, when Gerber finds in the purported Lockean natural
rights philosophy of the Declaration support for the notion that
the Supreme Court should find that state or federal governments
may not punish consensual sodomy or discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation, (pp. 189-190) or that prayer in the schools
should not be permitted, (p.5) or that there ought to be a constitutionally-recognizable right to die for persons in unbearable distress, (p. 180) one is excused if one raises an eyebrow. Less
problematic, and dead-on, I think, are his claims that the Constitution ought to be interpreted in a manner which results, in racial
cases, in equality of opportunity but not equality of outcome, (p.
174) and that a woman's "right" to have an abortion could not
exist in the constitution if the fetus is recognized as a human life.
(p. 182)
But even if Gerber, in his admirable zeal to apply his basic
theory, gets it a bit wrong, that doesn't necessarily mean that his
theory itself is flawed. Indeed his basic premise, or what he calls
his "underlying theme," that "the Constitution cannot be properly understood without recourse to history, political philosophy,
and law-all three" ought to be inscribed on the fly-leaves of all
texts in first-year Constitutional law. So how might one avoid
the open-ended problems of Constitutional interpretation to
10. Indeed, it is just this sort of moving to higher levels of generality that recently
allowed Michael Perry to make the curious claim that it is proper to view William Brennan as an originalist. Michael Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? 213
n.15 (Oxford U. Press, 1994). To his credit, Gerber appears implicitly, at least, to acknowledge this problem. (p. 9n.)
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which Gerber is also dedicated to avoiding? An answer, I think,
is implicit in an observation that he has himself made, but has not
yet fully developed. That is that while "Modem students of political philosophy and jurisprudence often draw distinctions between terms like 'natural equity,' 'natural justice,' 'natural law,'
and 'natural rights,' ... An examination of the early cases reveals
that early American judges and lawyers typically did not make
such distinctions." (p. 106 n. *)
What this means, I think, is that if one wants truly to be an
originalist, one cannot simply rely, as Gerber too often does, exclusively on an individualistic "natural rights" Lockean philosophy. One must also take into account (as the Framers most
assuredly did) Ciceronian or Thomistic ideas of universal natural
law, Aristotelian conceptions of justice, and the English common
law's concepts of inherent powers of government and duties of
the subject. Moreover, while Republicanism and Christianity
ought not to be regarded (as Gerber quite properly claims they
ought not to be) as the exclusive guides to Constitutional interpretation, they are surely of some importance in understanding
the way the framers approached constitutional problems.ll Also
of more importance than Gerber accords to it, I think, was the
movement both in the Constitution and certainly in the Bill of
Rights to safeguard rights and liberties by preserving the dual
sovereignty of state and federal governments. If Gerber assimilated all of this, I think he'd have a tougher time, for example,
supporting the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence regarding
essentially domestic matters such as sexual orientation or school
prayer. Surely one who took seriously Federalism would find it
difficult to justify many of the "incorporation" decisions which
have transmogrified wise restrictions on the Federal government
(to protect state sovereignty) into shackles to be attached to the
states.12
Thus, for my money at least, while securing the natural
rights spoken of in the Declaration was one important goal of
Constitutional government, it was not the only goal, and a theory
of interpretation which is dedicated to supra-constitutional principles and eschews simple positivism cannot begin and end with
the Declaration. Indeed, a theory which tried to come to grips
with the late eighteenth-century conceptions of natural law, revealed religion, civic republican philosophy, dual state and fed11. See generally Kloppenberg, 74 J. Am. Hist. (cited in note 3); Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 4).
12. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution at 160-66 (cited in note 4).
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eral sovereignty, and Lockean natural rights might even end up
precise enough to avoid the need to pursue higher levels of generality, and thus the problem of arbitrariness could be contained.
When we needed Constitutional change, then, we would not rely
on the judges' senses of how higher levels of Lockean theory
would resolve the problem, we could-as Gerber quite wisely
recommends as a check on the Justices (pp. 139-144)-simply use
the Article V process, and amend the document.
But this last is the familiar rant of the reviewer that if he
were writing the book he would have written a different one.13
On Gerber's own terms his book ought to be regarded as a successful and quite comprehensive proposal for rethinking Constitutional law in general and the selection and operation of
Supreme Court Justices in particular. It is written with sparkle
and passion and with a lucidity rare in works about Constitutional hermeneutics. It deserves to be widely read, debated, and
improved upon by other scholars and by Gerber himself. Indeed,
To Secure These Rights ought to attract the attention not only of
scholars of constitutional law, but of those of history, politics,
and moral philosophy. Perhaps it will even do its part in bringing
us back the kind of synthesis of those fields that the framers enjoyed, and without which interpretation faithful to the original
understanding cannot take place.

LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE. By
Gerald Gunther.l New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1994. Pp.
ix, 818. Cloth, $39.00; Paper, $19.95.
John Wertheimer2

Like countless other students, I got my first serious exposure
to the intricacies of American constitutionalism through the
pages of Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law, the leading
casebook in the field. At the time, I thought it strange that, amid
13. Made more ironic here because I did, and attempted to derive supra-constitu·
tional principles, and apply them to present problems in much the same way that Gerber
did. See Presser, Recapturing the Constitution (cited in note 4). He does a much better
job than I did, however, at clearly laying out a coherent and widespread understanding of
his particular brand of extra-constitutional interpretive guides, tackles a wider field of
contemporary problems, and offers a more expansive set of remedies for containing judicial arbitrariness. (pp. 134-61)
1. Professor of Constitutional Law, Stanford University.
2. Assistant Professor of History, Davidson College.

